I think it’s cool in concept, but it’s more of an activism tool than a convenience tool. I’m my experience at least, it didn’t block as much as I’d like.
I’ve found it actually makes it easier for advertisers to track me - I tried turning it off briefly, expecting completely random, useless ads, but instead saw disturbingly relevant ads, which basically reflected a profile of the sites I visited regularly, for example, ads for products sold by random obscure sites I visit regularly. Not only that, but the ads followed me across sites.
Not entirely sure why that was but my guess is that by simply allowing ads to load, you’re letting ad providers like Facebook/Google collect far more identifying information to improve their confidence that you’ve visited a given site, vs by not loading them all they know is their tracking/ad script was requested. Similarly, by clicking an ad you’re now also visiting an advertiser’s site, loading even more tracking.
For AdNauseum to achieve it’s stated purpose, it would also need to visit random sites to pollute ad providers’ profiles on you.
In this case, protecting one’s privacy and encrypting communications is no longer merely suspect, but participates of constituting a “clandestine behavior”, a way of concealing criminal intentions. In several memos, the DGSI keeps on trying to demonstrate how the use of tools such as Signal, Tor, Proton, Silence, etc., would be evidence of a desire to hide compromising elements. And on top of this, as we denounced last June, the DGSI justifies the absence of evidence of a terrorist project by the use of encryption tools itself. According to them, if they lack of elements proving a terrorist intent, it’s because those proofs are necessarily hold back in those much-vaunted encrypted and inaccessible messages. In reaction of such absurd vicious circle, lawyers of a person charged denounced the fact that “here, the absence of evidence becomes an evidence itself“.
how the use of tools such as Signal, Tor, Proton, Silence, etc., would be evidence of a desire to hide compromising elements.
I tried to write about how stupid this statement is with logical explanation but this doesn’t even deserve that. If that goes anywhere near the actual law enforcement policy, that is no longer a free country.
I offer an alternative service to having a wallet. I securely hold on to the contents of it and let you use the cards in it whenever you want, helps protect from theft, etc.
Oh you don’t want to use this service because there’s no need for someone else to have access to your wallet? What are you hiding? Clearly you’d be using the service if you weren’t also doing something illegal.
I’d extend the metaphor further to highlight that there’s no such thing as a secure backdoor, but this is just the same shit police-state authoritarianism we’ve been seeing grow in the UK since Thatcher—surveil fucking everyone, in every way possible whilst they do absolutely anything; because you’re not a citizen, you’re just a criminal or potential criminal.
And we’ve got a load of shitty news outlets making idiots clap every time their rights are eroded, because this time it’ll stop the paedos and terrorists for good. Like all the other times.
Oh I’m sure pedos are just sending CSAMs via Whatsapp willy-nilly. Not using already very much accessible numerous e2e encrypted methods that can be self-hosted and harder to find/track. We can definitely catch them for sure if this comes to be a thing!
This is just the laziest excuse for a surveillance. Fuck them.
Naive. There must be more practical methods to counter child abuse. For example always holding people accountable when they are known to hurt children would be a good start.
What’s stopping someone from just sending public keys or something through Signal and encrypting their messages that way? There’s no way to enforce this with such simple loopholes present. We shouldn’t be focusing on breaking privacy and instead invest in helping existing victims in ways that actually matter.
Whilst I agree with your sentiment, this isn’t how end-to-end encrypted chats work. Otherwise, it would be impossible to know the messages you’re receiving are coming from the person you think they are.
I suppose you’re right, but forging that kind of thing would be difficult, also considering the PKI already in place. If someone has their own email server and they sign/encrypt their email, and host their public key on a key server somewhere, it’s highly unlikely that all three would be compromised. and even if that fails, you could just meet up with them and exchange flash drives with keys.
Stupid bastards. I hope Apple and WhatsApp and Signal all just turn off service in the EU. Let the users eat these assholes alive when their apps stop working.
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