simplex seems to check all boxes for respecting privacy. it doesnt rely on using any identity (no strong selectors like email addresses or phone number). seems very forward-thinking in its concepts.
there is now a discovery mechanism of some sort… but otherwise it’s a feature and not a bug that you can only identify people whom you had an initial exchange with. much preferable than something that Signal that without asking (and without opting out?) will by default access all your contacts and match them through the use of a strong selector (phone number) also:
i think with the minimal knowledge the server has of its users (and the no-identity concept) this really limits risk. Also it means that for the most tight of security models, one can use their own server (which is not feasible with most other chat protocols)
I hate relying on anything big corp for privacy. Thanks for the reply and I’ll keep this in mind. It seems so far matrix chat is the only e2e chat that can remove the conversation from an individuals device once their removed from a room. I will have to do deeper research into matrix to see it it fits my use cases. I’m just not sure how it stacks up against other big name chat platforms as far as security/privacy goes. I’ve heard of it before. Never deep dived into the data.
Its my understanding the metadata is only stored on the home server that runs for the clients, so under a self host scenario the hoster would be the only party that could access such metadata. One big con to Matrix is that it lacks ephemeral messaging so I’m not sure if chat history is stored on client side once the server goes offline? I cannot find an answer through browser search or documentation. Couldn’t the hosted server be restarted anytime and it would essentially delete the metadata generated each cycle and chat history as well because the chat room would be deleted? Or ran inside say persistent Tails and with a device shutdown or unplug all data would be wiped due to its ram only nature while persistence only keeps the base setup of matrix not a full carbon copy so a new chat would be generated each power cycle. Similar to VPN services running on ram. Thoughts anyone?
This is called ephemeral messaging. A good feature of many apps. But doesn’t serve the same purpose for which I am asking. Thanks for mentioning another option other than the usual messenger apps. This is the description for others copied from a basic browser search.
Keybase is a key directory that maps social media identities to encryption keys (including, but not limited to PGP keys) in a publicly auditable manner. Additionally it offers an end-to-end encrypted chat and cloud storage system, called Keybase Chat and the Keybase Filesystem respectively.
Website here for those interested in reading about it -> keybase.io
This part about the zoom acquisition is true, but to date no sketchy things have been committed to the client repos, they’re open source
Personally I think the acquisition was to disrupt development, not to hijack it. You’re right that dev work essentially stopped at that time, outside of security fixes.
Also, it doesn’t track you, it allows you to post public proofs so you can choose to let the people you connect with verify your identify. It’s not mandatory.
Calyx with Micro G does have benifits, but isn’t quite as good as sandboxing, and also doesn’t have some of the other degoogling and security Graphene does.
It depends on your threat model. If you simply want fewer targeted ads, there is a benefit. If you are a journalist under a dictatorship, there is little to no benefit.
First things first, there is no app like you describe. You have to take my word for it. Let’s say a certain country’s law enforcement might be very interested in taking to me if it knew role in certain events.
I examined many messaging and chat platforms, and the closest to what you’re asking for are custom Telegram clients that go a longer way to ensure that TG’s local data gets deleted properly (by default it doesn’t, easy peasy to get data from the local DB, half cleansed chats from 6 months ago pop up in exports or even the UI, etc).”, has a built in double bottom for accounts, etc. An example of what I am talking about is here: github.com/wrwrabbit (check the repos yourself).
Secondly, you must understand that when the law enforcement seizes a phone, upon initial quick examination (sometimes using brutality to force you to unlock it), they will shut it down to ensure it is not connected to the Internet. And then criminalists will use a special black box device sold by an Israeli cybersec firm (its name always escapes me, but I think the product might be called Pegasus) to extract all data for offline analysis.
So thirdly, you must not rely on any app that conditionally removes data from a device. You must not entrust your well-being to it. Which leaves you basically the only choice: only ephemeral messaging capabilities which are available only when you are in the app, through the server over which you have full control.
Or your messaging sessions must take place only when you’re in a secure location. And even then you should have a “wipe all button” in case the police come after you unexpectedly.
The OS itself is private because it’s DeGoogled. I also installed GApps because I wanted the convinence of the App store and core feature I’ve been used to for so long.
I also knew the moment I did the google-fication privacy was out the window.
I was fine with LineageOS and would happily go back when my Pixel7a becomes EOL.
Motorola phones are very easy to mod(root,custom rom) and even if you brick the phone in most cases you can just use the lenovo recovery tool. I personally use crdroid but lineage is fine too. I recommend you use microg with magisk to hide that the device is root/has custom rom. You can also just use shelter for the banking apps.
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